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　“I like Americans, but they are somewhat unicellular.”  Ozawa Ichiro,(2) the 
former leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, spoke in front of the media, 
and he continued: “I don’t think Americans are smart,” though he valued highly 
democracy in the United States.(3)  It is rather surprising that Ozawa could still 
seek election as party leader and prime minister after publicly condemning the 
entire populace of an allied nation as “unicellular”, which is not only untrue in 
a figurative sense, but politically incorrect and simply an expression of crude 
prejudice.  
　Since Ozawa was a politician, his inappropriate comments were reported 
on television and newspapers both inside and outside of Japan, but this type 
of blanketing of a group of people with one or two oversimplified features is, 
unfortunately, not uncommon in daily conversation.  “Americans are friendly,” 
“Japanese are devious,” “Portuguese are lazy,” and suchlike.  Moreover, I have 
often heard Japanese people make generalisations about themselves, as well 
as some visitors to Japan who seem to have become instant anthropologists. 
There even exists a genre of popular literature called Nihon Bunkaron,  more 
commonly referred to in English texts as Nihonjinron, which discusses and 
purports to give tangible answers to the question “Who are the Japanese?” 
Works of this kind are read widely and many books became best sellers. 
Theologians in Japan also began to take up this theme to make theology 
relevant to Japan, or to critique Japan theologically.  For instance, Kitamori 
Kazo, in his The Japanese and the Bible,(4) his last book published during his 
lifetime, attempts an “intercultural (that is, between Japanese culture and the 
culture of the Bible) reading,” one earlier example of which was the concept of 
Tsurasa he introduced in the Theology of the Pain of God.(5)  Another attempt was 
(2) In the main text, Japanese names are given in Japanese style: surname followed by given 
name. Names in citations are always in western style.
(3) “Americans ‘simpleminded’” The Japan Times (Thursday, Aug. 26, 2010).
(4) Kazo Kitamori, Nihonjin to Seisho [The Japanese and the Bible] (Tokyo: Kyo bun kan, 
1995).
(5) Kitamori, Kami no Itami no Shingaku [Theology of the Pain of God] (Tokyo: Shin Kyo 
Shuppan, 1946).
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made by Furuya Yasuo (1926-) and Ohki Hideo (1928-) in Theology of Japan, 
which first appeared in Japanese in 1989.(6) This is a noteworthy work which 
takes “Japan” as a subject of theological analysis and reflection.  Ohki describes 
their project:
What is a “theology of Japan”?  It is, in essence, “to theologize 
[theologieren]” ‘Japan.’  It is to critique Japan as an object of theology.  
It does not mean “theological studies in Japan” that are rarely done in 
the obscure corner of the Japanese intellectual world as the caricature 
of western theological studies; it is also not an attempt to produce 
Japanese theology by going through the trouble of “Japanising” 
western theology.  The “of” in the “theology of Japan” is not genitive 
but objective.  Therefore, it is not the theology that Japan owns, but the 
theology whose object is Japan.(7)  
　However, the Nihonjinron project was based on false presuppositions, 
which have led to erroneous conclusions about Japanese society. If attempts at 
theological analysis of Japan or the Japanese draw on the arguments or indeed 
the fruits of Nihonjinron, they may unknowingly participate and promote a 
discourse, which both is a product of and produces “power” as described by 
Foucault.(8)  This article shall critique Nihonjinron in order to understand the 
challenges that theology in Japan faces today.
1  “Who are the Japanese?”
　“Who are the Japanese?” “What distinguishes the Japanese?”  These 
questions are not new but have been posed throughout the history of Japan in 
(6) Yasuo Furuya and Hideo Ohki, Nihon no Shingaku [Theology of Japan] (Tokyo: Yorudan 
sha, 1989).
(7) Ohki, “A Theology of Japan: Independence of the Intellect in Japan” in Hideo Ohki et al, 
A Theology of Japan: Origins and Task in the Age of Globalization (Seigakuin University 
Press, 2005), 19. 
(8) Cf. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969) ; translated by A.M. Sheridan 
Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
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the context of its international relations.  During the Edo period, scholars of 
National Learning (Kokugaku) pursued what is distinctly Japanese in contrast 
to pervasive influences from China and Korea.  When Japan encountered the 
modern Western nations, there was another tide of literature which addressed 
the identity of the Japanese.  Nitobe Inazo (1862-1933), who was a Christian 
and a classmate of Uchimura Kanzo (1861-1930) in Sapporo Agricultural School 
(founded by William S. Clark in Hokkaido), wrote a book entitled Bushido: 
The Soul of Japan.  It was written originally in English and published in 1900. 
Because of the attention given to Japan in the world after Japan’s victory in the 
First Sino-Japanese War, the book became a bestseller. Nitobe explains Bushido 
as “the code of moral principle which the knights were required or instructed 
to observe.” The fighting knights (Bushi) were a privileged class in feudal 
Japan. With privilege, they soon realised, came great responsibilities. This 
sense of being one of the elite led the warriors to hold to a common standard 
to carry out their responsibilities and to act honourably towards each other. 
The sources of Bushido, according to Nitobe, are Buddhism, Shintoism, and 
the teachings of Confucius and Mencius.(9)  At about the same time, Okakura 
Tenshin (1863-1913) also published a book in English, The Book of Tea, which 
discussed subjects including Taoism, Zen, and Japanese arts in relation to the 
influence of tea in everyday life in Japan.(10)  The difference between the works 
of Nitobe and Okakura and Nihonjinron, which were largely produced from the 
1960s onwards, is that the former was mainly addressed to the world outside of 
Japan, whereas Nihonjinron’s main audience is the Japanese themselves, as if 
to reassure the Japanese people by providing them with identity markers in the 
age of globalisation. 
2  “Japan” as a Category of Social Anthropology
　In postcolonial studies, anthropology and its products, ethnographies, are 
(9)   Inazo Nitobe, Bushido: The Soul of Japan (The Leeds and Bible Company, 1900).
(10) Kakuzo Okakura, The Book of Tea (New York: Putnam’s, 1906).
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criticized because the origin of anthropology as a field of study is undeniably 
rooted in, and coincides with, the emergence of the colonial powers. It was 
employed to describe the colonial subject to the colonizer, and to reinforce 
colonial discourse to and interpellate the obser ved subjects, who were 
constructed as “the Other” to the observer from the metropolis. Since the two 
activities to produce ethnography, fieldwork and writing, are bound by the 
observer-writer’s value system, it is not only misleading to draw a conclusion on 
any society, but could play down to the colonial discourse.(11) Another problem 
is the issue of cultural essentialism, which presupposes that individuals in a 
certain group or society inevitably share several describable characteristics in 
their personalities, thoughts, or actions. In postcolonial theory, the fallacious 
nature of essentialism has already been pointed out.(12) Mario Aguilar warns 
us against using the concept of “culture” for simplistic pigeon-holing in spite of 
the diversity and complexity of each society: “In saying that somebody belongs 
to a British or American culture we are basically impeding the exploration of 
the possibility of complex social realities operated by complex individuals.”(13) 
The essentialism would be more prominent especially when the ethnography 
claims to cover a large group such as an entire people in one nation-state. 
It is undeniable that there are many different customs and great linguistic 
differences within Japan. Those diversities depend on region, gender, class, 
occupation, and other elements, which intertwine to create a complex identity 
for each person in the society.
　Today, sociology and anthropology operate on a similar basis, and many 
sociologists and anthropologists are aware of the issues around the history 
of anthropology.  The goal of ethnography is understood not merely to be to 
demonstrate a society’s uniqueness but to find principles that are observable 
(11) See “Ethnography” in Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Grif fins & Helen Tif fin, Post-Colonial 
Studies: The Key Concepts, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2007), 79-83. Cf. Edward Said, 
Orientalism, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 77-92.
(12) Ashcroft, Griffins & Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, 73.
(13) Mario I. Aguilar & Louise J. Lawrence, Anthropology and Biblical Studies : Avenues of 
Approach (Leiden: Deo Publishing, 2004), 307.
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in other human societies and to relate them to one another.(14) It is also an 
accepted norm that an anthropologist studies a society to which he or she is, 
in one way or another, “foreign.”(15) However, Japanese intellectuals, social 
anthropologists or otherwise, have written works describing their own ‘culture’ 
and emphasising its uniqueness. These works formed the genre of Nihonjinron 
or Nihon Bunkaron, which literally means “propositions about Japanese 
people”.(16) Nihonjinron articles have been published in popular as well as 
academic journals, and numerous books have been written in the genre.(17)
Since the Nihonjinron genre is widely read in Japan, one can conclude that the 
ideas that are presented in the Nihonjinron literature reflect a popular cultural 
identity, a cultural-nationalistic view of Japanese society.
　One of the characteristics of Nihonjinron literature is its assertion that 
Japanese society is homogeneous. Marcus Banks presents two perspectives 
on ethnicity: primordialist and instrumentalist. The former sees ethnicity as 
(14) Joy Hendry, ‘Introduction: The Contribution of Social Anthropology to Japanese Studies’ 
in Interpreting Japanese Society,  Joy Hendry ed. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1998), 8.
(15) Ibid., 4. Hendry comments on this issue: “It might be commented that a native Japanese 
is in a better position to elucidate concepts such as time and space in their own 
language, but this leads to a second characteristic feature of social anthropology. We 
tend to look at societies other than our own, even in the countries where we have been 
brought up. This is the crux of the matter, for the values and categories we are taught 
as children become natural to us, unquestioned unless we move away. In looking at our 
own societies, we run the risk of taking for granted things which are in fact culturally 
relative.”
(16) Nihon means “Japan,” jin, “people,” and ron, “proposition” or “theory.” As Harumi Befu 
points out, while the term Nihon Bunkaron (Propositions about Japanese Culture) is 
the more accepted term among the Japanese, Nihonjinron is the most frequently used 
among anthropologists who write in English. Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity 
(Melbourne: Trans-Pacific Press, 2001), 2.
(17) Ibid., 7. Befu cites a partially annotated bibliography complied in 1978 on Nihonjinron 
literature. According to the bibliography, which covers the period 1946 to 1978, 698 
titles were published. Befu says, “If a similar compilation since 1978 were added to the 
list, the total would no doubt far exceed a thousand. If articles from periodicals were 
added, the number would easily multiply by a factor of two or three.” See Nihonjinron, 
NRI Reference No. 2 (Kamakura: Nomura Sg Kenkyjo, 1978).
キリストと世界　第 21 号　　Yumi Murayama-Cain
37
an intrinsic element of human identity; the latter views it as an artefact for 
common purposes. Goodman, who quotes Banks, suggests that the Nihonjinron 
literature, especially after World War II, tends towards primordialism rather 
than instrumentalism.(18) The authors of Nihonjinron presupposed that there 
is a continuity between Japanese society today and the “traditional Japanese” 
society. Many books employed a broad approach and attempted to reduce 
“Japaneseness” to one or two concepts. They pay attention neither to the 
insider minority groups in Japan, such as Burakumin, Ainu, those who have 
been discriminated against — such as people with disabilities or atomic bomb 
victims — nor to the immigrant ethnic minorities living in Japan.
　Another noteworthy characteristic of Nihonjinron is that the writings in this 
genre compare Japanese society with the monolithic “West,” and by doing so, 
the authors assert how different Japan is from the West.(19) This dichotomy 
existed as early as the nineteenth century. The idea of “Japan versus the 
West” developed as a consequence of national consciousness ever since Japan 
encountered the modern technology and ideology of the Western countries. 
To summarize, Nihonjinron literature, which describes Japanese society as 
a monolithic culture, is an artefact emerging from the primordialist view of 
society, and it also functions to reinforce this unified view of Japaneseness.
3  The Roots of Nihonjinron
　Around the time when Japan’s first constitution was promulgated in 1889, 
and the construction of a new social order for “modern Japan” under the Meiji 
government was under way, a reactionary movement for a revival of Japanese 
mores arose. It eventually led the country to ultra-nationalism, and militarism. 
Japan rapidly equipped itself for the colonisation of East Asia, which eventually 
led the nation into the Asia-Pacific War. In the defeat of 1945, Japan had an 
(18) Marcus Banks, Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions (London: Routledge, 1996), 36. 
Quoted by Roger Goodman, ‘Making Major Culture’ in A Companion to the Anthropology 
of Japan,  Jennifer Robertson ed. (Blackwell Publishing Inc., 2005), 59.
(19) Goodman, ‘Making Major Culture’, 69.
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experience similar to its encounter with the West in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Following Japan’s unconditional surrender and subsequent 
occupation, the Allies drafted a new democratic pacifist constitution for Japan. 
Japan again became a nation that followed the example of “the West,” especially 
to emulate the former enemy and most powerful member of the Allies, the 
United States.
　Once again Japan faced the issue of identity in the aftermath of a radical 
change brought about by the West. In this time of national crisis, an American 
anthropologist wrote what became one of the most famous ethnographical 
studies of the Japanese. Ruth Benedict’s book, The Chrysanthemum and the 
Sword (1946), set an example for the works that became known collectively as 
Nihonjinron.
　The Chrysanthemum and the Sword was published in Japan during the time of 
national self-examination after the defeat in the Asia-Pacific War. Benedict was 
assigned to the study of Japan in June 1944, when the victory of the Allies was 
becoming plausible. Benedict wrote, “I was asked to use all the techniques I 
could as a cultural anthropologist to spell out what the Japanese were like.” (20) 
After its original publication in 1946, the book was translated into Japanese in 
1948 and became a bestseller in Japan.
　Benedict began her book saying, “The Japanese were the most alien enemy 
the United States had ever fought in an all-out struggle,” because Japan was 
outside of the Western cultural tradition and thus did not have the same 
conventions about the conduct of war as the United States.(21) In the dawn of 
victory, the United States and the Allies “had to know what their government 
could count on from the people. [They] had to try to understand Japanese 
habits of thought and emotion and the patterns into which these habits fell. 
[They] had to know the sanctions behind these actions and opinions.” (22) 
She said her project “is about what makes Japan a nation of Japanese.” (23) In 
(20) Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1947), 3.
(21) Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 1.
(22) Ibid., 4.
(23) Ibid., 13.
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other words, Ruth Benedict’s ethnography of Japan was a typical example of 
anthropology functioning as a servant, or brother, of colonial power: the study 
equips the colonizer with the knowledge of occupants or colonized using an 
essentialist view of the society of object.
　Because the war was not over when she was assigned for this study, 
Benedict could not come to Japan for fieldwork. She was not proficient in 
the Japanese language either. Thus, Benedict resorted to gather as many 
sources as she could: films, novels, radio programs, and interviews with 
Japanese prisoners of war. From those sources, Benedict tried to explain how 
the Japanese themselves understood certain behaviour, putting aside what 
she calls “Occidental assumptions.” After warning against American cultural 
nationalism,(24) she explained the Japanese system, which makes people behave 
differently from Americans.
　Benedict observed that the emperor functions as the symbol of the Japanese 
people, and so is inseparable from Japan. “A Japan without the Emperor is 
not Japan.” (25) The emperor occupied the top of the hierarchy, yet was spared 
the criticisms that people directed against their government. While for many 
Americans freedom was the foremost value, Benedict argued, for Japanese 
people, taking “one’s proper hierarchical station” was the basis of moral 
conduct. This was the most important idea in understanding how Japanese 
people behave in their society as well as understanding Japan’s actions 
internationally. Japan did not see its place as being within the spheres of 
influence of foreign nations. Rather, Japan determined that its “proper station” 
was above the countries of Asia and elsewhere in the world.
　Therefore, according to Benedict, morality for the Japanese is relational. 
Righteousness should be accompanied with the recognition of one’s place 
in the great network of mutual indebtedness. In this context, the notions of 
On [indebtedness], Chu [loyalty to the superior], and Ko [filial piety] are 
(24) Ibid., 15-6. Benedict commented: “The study of comparative cultures too cannot flourish 
when men are so defensive about their own way of life that it appears to them to be by 
definition the sole solution in the world.”
(25) Ibid., 32.
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interconnected. The emperor is beyond any reach of mundane controversies, 
yet is the supreme object of Chu, to which the repayment of On is limitless. 
One’s highest duty is not the love of one’s country. It is the “repayment of the 
emperor in person,” and obedience to the law becomes repayment of one’s 
highest indebtedness.(26) Because moral conduct does not depend on the 
categorical imperative, desirable behaviour changes according to what one’s 
Chu demands in a particular situation. While the nation was at war in the name 
of the emperor, the people fought. Once the emperor announced the surrender, 
the people accepted the defeat without making any further argument. “In 
[Japan’s] own eyes this enormous payment nevertheless bought something she 
supremely valued: the right to say that it was the emperor who had given the 
order even if that order was capitulation. Even in defeat the highest law was still 
Chu.” (27)
　In spite of her disclaiming of Occidentalism, Benedict’s “us and them” 
language is clearly a sign of Occidental superiority. However, she tried to 
persuade her readers to recognise that the “strangeness of the Japanese” 
could be “normal” in its own right, while American understanding of what is 
natural could become relative and potentially strange from other societies’ 
perspectives.(28) For example, she compares State Shinto in Japan with American 
expression of nationalism. “Since it was concerned with proper respect to 
national symbols, as saluting the flag is in the United States, State Shinto was, 
they said, ‘no religion.’ Japan therefore could require it of all citizens without 
violating the Occidental dogma of religious freedom any more than the United 
States violates it in requiring a salute to the Stars and Stripes.” (29) In any 
case, her study was clearly much valued by the Allied authorities during the 
occupation of Japan, especially in their policy regarding the emperor.
　Many anthropologists today criticise The Chrysanthemum as homogenizing 
(26) Ibid., 129.
(27) Ibid., 132.
(28) Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The Anthropologists as Author (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1988).
(29) Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 87.
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and ahistorical. It is compared with John Embree’s Suye Mura, A Japanese 
Village (1939), as the latter is an ethnography of a Japanese village based on 
the author’s fieldwork.(30) However, as a study commissioned by the Allies at the 
end of the Second World War, Benedict’s ethnography of Japan accomplished 
its purpose: her study gave enough knowledge and justification for the 
occupation army’s policies during the eight years of occupation. Benedict does 
make a comment to suggest that the system she observed “was singular. It was 
not Buddhism and it was not Confucianism. It was Japanese — the strength 
and the weakness of Japan.” (31) With such a conclusion, she managed to make 
“Japan”, which consisted of many different personalities and layers of society, 
into a tangible whole, understandable in the context of the occupation.
　After its publication, the book became an unexpected best-seller in 
Japan. Sixty years after it was written, in Japan the book is still widely read 
and considered a classic. It was the Japanese people who appreciated the 
ethnography that was written at the request of the United States government. 
The two concepts of “shame culture” and “hierarchical groupism” were 
emphasised by Japanese readers as distinctively Japanese notions in contrast 
with the “Western” guilt culture and individualism, much more so than 
the author herself, who never used the term “groupism”. In the ten years 
following the book’s publication, these two “Japanese characteristics” were 
interpreted as reasons for the Japanese failure to modernize.(32) Ironically, 
The Chrysanthemum’s depiction of “Japan” and “Japaneseness” provided the 
Japanese identity for the growing ethnic nationalism of the Japanese people.(33)
Benedict’s work, at least as understood in Japan, became a prototype for the 
(30) Ibid., 3-16. Robertson commends Embree’s work for a “more historicized description 
of Japan instead of pursuing the timeless Japaneseness” of The Chrysanthemum and 
the Sword. Cf. Tamotsu Aoki, Nihon Bunkaron no Henyo [The Transformation of 
Propositions on Japanese Culture] (Tokyo: Chuko bunko, 1999), 34-36.
(31) Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 19.
(32) Aoki, Nihon Bunkaron no Henyo, 62.
(33) Jennifer Robertson, ‘Introduction: Putting and Keeping Japan in Anthropology’ in A 
Companion to the Anthropology of Japan, Jennifer Robertson ed. (Blackwell Publishing 
Inc., 2005), 7.
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Nihonjinron literature.
4  Nihonjinron
　From 1960s until the late 1980s,(34) Japan achieved remarkable economic 
growth, which wiped out the image of a “defeated nation.” Goodman calls 
attention to an interesting fact: 
As the Japanese economy expanded and looked set to become the 
largest in the world by the end of the century, the government, under 
the direction of then prime minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, established 
and generously funded the International Research Center for Japanese 
Studies (known as Nichibunken) in Kyoto to look at the origins and 
development of what constituted Japanese culture. The publication 
of works about what constituted the key characteristics of Japanese 
society and culture flourished and, rather than being categorized by 
disciplinary background, were increasingly shelved in bookshops 
under the generic heading of Nihonjinron. (35) 
　Following in Benedict’s footsteps, most of the Nihonjinron literature from this 
period also tried to describe “Japaneseness” in contrast with “the West”. The 
authors also attempted to summarise Japanese society with a few key concepts. 
A difference is that while distinctively Japanese characteristics identified in The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword or in the Nihonjinron of the 1940s and 1950s 
are understood by the Japanese readers to be negative and reasons for failure, 
Nihonjinron from 1960s through 1980s presented what is uniquely “Japanese” 
as the basis of Japan’s economic success. The “Japanese system” was re-
evaluated in a positive light, and “Japan’s role in the world” was asserted. This 
type of Nihonjinron became “a mass consumer product.” (36)
　Two major works that are categorised as Nihonjinron and became bestsellers, 
(34) Numerous works were produced on this topic before 1960 as well, but the two books by 
Nakane and Doi will be dealt with in this article as examples.
(35) Goodman, ‘Making Major Culture’, 59.
(36) Aoki, Nihon Bunkaron no Henyo, 87-88.
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being reprinted many times, are Nakane Chie’s (1926-) Tateshakai no Ningen 
Kankei “Relationships in a Vertical Society”, which was later translated into 
English and published as Japanese Society)(37) in 1967 and Doi Takeo’s (1920-
2009) Amae no Kouzou (translated into English as Anatomy of Dependence) in 
1971. These two books are particularly well known in Japan, and succeeded 
in popularising certain ideas about Japanese society. In the early 1970s, the 
Foreign Ministry had Japanese embassies and consulates give away free copies 
of Nakane’s Japanese Society to foreigners interested in Japan.(38)
5  Nakane Chie, Japanese Society, and Doi Takeo, 
	 The Anatomy of Dependence
　Nakane’s Japanese Society is based on her thesis, submitted in 1964, in which 
she compared the groupism of Japanese society with that of Indian society. 
Nakane concluded that Japanese groupism is based on ba — “place,” or 
“frame” — while that of Indian society is based on “attributes” or qualification. 
Examples of attributes are class, educational background, status, gender, or 
age, whereas ba includes one’s hometown, organisation or company. According 
to Nakane, for a Japanese person, where one belongs and where one stands in 
the group is more important for one’s identity. It is more important for them 
to know that one belongs to company A or school B, than to say that one is an 
engineer or a professor.(39) Inside the group (Uchi) is distinguished from the 
outside (Soto),(40) and the group operates much like a family or household, “Ie”.(41)
　She argues that this principle of the household structure is a characteristic 
also seen among Japanese social groups. In Japan, a company functions like 
(37) Hata and Smith point out that the English version is different in significant details from 
the Japanese original. See Hiromi Hata & Wendy Smith, ‘Nakane’s “Japanese Society” as 
Utopian Thought’, in Journal of Contemporary Asia 13.3 (1983): 361-88.
(38) Goodman, ‘Making Major Culture’, 61.
(39) Chie Nakane, Tateshakai no Ningen Kankei [Relationships in a Vertical Society] (Tokyo: 
Kodansha, 1967), 30; Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Penguin Books Ltd, 1973),  3.
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a household, where the relationship between an employer and employees is 
like that of a father and sons. The group also includes an employee’s family, 
thus “it ‘engages’ him ‘totally’.” (42) She contrasts this group structure with “the 
Western” company which is based on contract and one’s qualifications. Nakane 
concludes her book with the idea that Japanese interpersonal relationships tend 
to be tangible and local, and that this creates a society that is different from 
Western society, which is based on contracts. People’s identities depend on 
their relationships instead of their beliefs or convictions, which resonates with 
Ruth Benedict’s observation.
　Nakane argues that Japanese society is “a homogeneous society built on a 
vertical organizational principle, ” and points out that the one factor dominating 
Japanese way of thinking is “relativism.” (43) Japanese readers of Nakane 
understood her thesis as explaining the uniqueness of Japanese society and 
thus its industrial and economic success.(44)
　Five years after Tateshakai, Doi Takeo’s Amae no Kouzou was published and 
also immediately became a bestseller. Roger Goodman describes this book as 
“psychological glue, which holds together Nakane’s sociological model.” (45) 
During his year of study in the United States, the author, a psychologist and 
(40) Uchi and Soto are categories that explain the Japanese people’s attitude toward inside 
and outside. While inside is clean and safe, outside is unclean and dangerous. A 
Japanese child first learns this distinction by associating inside and outside of the house 
with being clean and dirty, respectively. However, these categories also apply to explain 
attitudes toward insiders and outsiders. See Joy Hendry, Understanding Japanese Society. 
3rd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 47-49.
(41) Nakane, Japanese Society, 4. Ie is a technical term to describe the Japanese household, 
which was a legal unit before the Second World War. Nakane defines Ie: “[T]he ie is a 
corporate residential group and, in the case of agriculture or other similar enterprises, ie 
is a managing body. The ie comprises household members, who thus make up the units 
of a distinguishable social group. In other words, the ie is a social group constructed on 
the basis of an established frame of residence and often management organisation”.
(42) Ibid., 8.
(43) Ibid., 154-155.
(44) Aoki, Nihon Bunkaron no Henyo, 95-96.
(45) Goodman, ‘Making Major Culture’, 62.
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doctor, thought that there were certain differences between the Japanese and 
Western mindsets (technically, the Japanese and American mindsets). He then 
concluded that the Japanese have a unique psychological element that cannot 
be explained by Western psychology. Doi calls this element “Amae,” which is 
translated as “dependency.”
　According to Doi, Amae is originally a child’s dependence on its mother, 
which the Japanese still maintain even when they become adults. This childlike 
dependence expects that the others will be accepting, protective, and will 
read one’s thoughts. One can find Amae in the Western culture as well, but 
not so prominently as in Japan.(46) Doi believes that the distinctive concepts 
of the Japanese that Benedict described such as Giri (indebtedness), Gimu 
(duty), Haji (shame) can be explained by this one psychological concept of 
dependence. He also suggests that Nakane’s notion of vertical relationships 
is also based on Amae: the members of an organisation seek indulgence from 
their superiors.(47) In a society in which Amae is dominant, an individual is in 
a web of dependent relationships, which excludes the idea of autonomy that 
prevails in the West. Therefore, for the Japanese, to lose one’s community 
or group to which one belongs is to lose one’s identity whereas a Westerner 
would consider that one’s intrinsic identity remains even when one is cut 
off from one’s community.(48) Doi is not always uncritical of Japanese society, 
yet his attempt to explain the society by using one concept, Amae, leads to 
the conclusion that Japanese society operates in a very different way from 
other societies, and that this is rooted in the psychological uniqueness of the 
Japanese people. Doi’s conclusion is only one step behind Tsunoda Tadanobu 
who proposed that there are differences in the functioning of the brains of 
native speakers of Japanese and of those who speak Western languages.(49)
(46) Takeo Doi, Amae no Kouzou [Structure of Dependence] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1971), 224; 
Takeo Doi, Anatomy of Dependence, Trans. by John Bester, (Tokyo, New York, San 
Francisco: Kodansha International, 1973), 142. Doi makes a comment that “Amae” is 
recognisable in the youth of other countries.
(47) Doi, Amae no Kouzou, 33 ; Doi, Anatomy of Dependence, 28.
(48) Doi, Amae no Kouzou, 202-16; Doi, Anatomy of Dependence, 132-41.
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　In the 1980s, when Japan was criticised, particularly by the United States, 
over economic and political issues such as not opening the Japanese market to 
foreign investment or not importing foreign-made products, the Nihonjinron, 
the Japanese view of themselves, also began to receive criticisms from outside 
of Japan. Australian sociologist Peter N. Dale criticised Nihonjinron for 
insisting on the homogeneous racial identity of the Japanese, which leads to 
“cultural fascism”.(50) Dale’s criticism against Nihonjinron can be seen as being 
as  ethnocentric as Nihonjinron itself as he tears down Nihonjinron from his 
“Western” perspectives.(51) However, Nihonjinron also received critiques from 
other sociologists and anthropologists such as Harumi Befu, Sugimoto Yoshio, 
and Ross Mouer.(52) Those critics found Nihonjinron problematic for several 
reasons.
6  A Critique of Nihonjinron: Essentialist and Ahistorical
　Goodman explains essentialist view of society: 
Essentialism is the charge that the analyst works on the assumption 
(49) Tadanobu Tsunoda, The Japanese Brain: Uniqueness and Universality, trans. by Oiwa 
Yoshinori (Tokyo: Taishukan Publishing Company, 1985); Tadanobu Tsunoda, Nihonjin 
no Nou [The Japanese Brain] (Tokyo: Taishukan Publishing Company, 1978). Befu 
comments on Tsunoda’s work: “Tsunoda’s view has received wide publicity, as one 
would imagine, and for some it has given a stamp of scientific validation for the so 
far fuzzy, social-science and humanistic — that is, ‘impressionistic’ — Nihonjinron 
arguments. Tsunoda’s view, however, is not entirely accepted by the medical community 
because of the smallness of the sample and the substandard scientific procedure 
employed in the study.” See Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity, 36.
(50) Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (London, Sydney, Oxford: Croom Helm 
and the Nissan Institute, 1986).
(51) Aoki, Nihon Bunkaron no Henyo, 173-174. Aoki points out that some of Dale’s criticisms 
of Japanese society are based on the very point he criticises: namely, the monolithic 
dichotomy of “the West” and Japan.
(52) Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity; Ross Mouer & Yoshio Sugimoto, Images of Japanese 
Society: A Study in the Social Structure of Reality (London, New York, Sydney, Haley: 
Kegan Paul International, 1986).
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that certain cultural features have always been present in any society 
and his or her job is simply to find and record these essentialist 
features and to document how they have continued vir tually 
unchanged over centuries. (53) 
　A characteristic common to both Nakane and Doi is this essentialist 
assumption, and they see those cultural features as encouraging or restricting 
an individual’s action and mindset within the society. There is also little 
consideration for the historical background that brings changes in a society, 
although any cultural symbols and systems are historically contextual. 
However, it is also possible to say that the state of a society is a result of 
conflicts between different groups that assert that their view of the society is 
the norm. In other words, one could argue, “Culture is only something that 
different interest groups draw on to legitimise their position.” (54) Harumi Befu’s 
criticism of Nihonjinron is based on the latter presupposition: he suggests that 
Nihonjinron is a replacement for national symbols, such as the flag, anthem, or 
imperial institutions, that have been tainted by Japan’s history in the first half of 
the twentieth century, and thus it is a “cultural manifestation of nationalism.”(55) 
National symbols, Befu argues, are created by the nation-state to remind its 
citizens of the importance of their nation, which both protects them and asks 
for sacrifices from them. Since other national symbols in Japan are politically 
divisive, Nihonjinron became a new, untainted, form of patriotic symbol.(56)
　When the essentialists’ view of culture is predominant in a society, it easily 
becomes a tool for those in power to manipulate the society, since this view 
could be used to affirm the status quo. For example, Goodman suggests that 
(53) Goodman, ‘Making Major Culture’, 65.
(54) Roger Goodman, ‘Thoughts on the relationship between anthropological Theory, 
Methods and the Study of Japanese Society’ in Dismantling the East-West Dichotomy, Joy 
Hendry & Heung Wah Won Eds. (London: Routledge, 2006), 29.
(55) Harumi Befu, ‘Symbols of Nationalism and Nihonjinron’ in Ideology and Practice in 
Modern Japan, Roger Goodman & Kirsten Refsing eds. (London: Routledge, 1992), 26; 
Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity, 86-104.
(56) Ibid., 26-7.
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there is considerable historical evidence to show that the Japanese company-as-
a-family model was deliberately developed for economic reasons.(57) He draws 
attention to the fact that Japan has one of the highest literacy rates in the world, 
which means that if a publication of ethnography of Japan becomes a bestseller, 
the idea presented in the ethnography could thus create or reinforce itself in 
the society.(58) In other words, what Said described about Orientalism is relevant 
here: 
A Text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual, and 
arising out of circumstances similar to the ones I have just described, 
is not easily dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of 
academics, institutions, and governments can accrue to it, surrounding 
it with still greater prestige than its practical successes warrant. Most 
important, such texts can create not only knowledge but also the very 
reality they appear to describe. In time such knowledge and reality 
produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose 
material presence or weight, not the originality or a given author, is 
really responsible for the texts produced out of it. (59) 
　Anthropologists on fieldwork often encounter Japanese informants who 
give them a brief summary of Nakane’s work as the explanation of Japanese 
society.(60) The works of Nakane or of Doi themselves do not seem to promote 
nationalism or patriotism in a direct sense; however, the notion of the 
uniqueness and homogeneity of the Japanese is an idea that is central to Shinto 
myth, which in turn is the foundation of the claim of a unique and unbroken 
(57) Goodman, ‘Making Major Culture’, 66.
(58) Hata and Smith criticises Nakane’s Japanese Society for reinforcing and legitimising 
a certain view of Japan on behalf of the state and for the benefit of large companies. 
See Hata & Smith, ‘Nakane’s “Japanese Society” as Utopian Thought’, 361-388. Joy 
Hendry, on the other hand, evaluates Nakane positively. See Hendry, ‘Introduction: 
The Contribution of Social Anthropology to Japanese Studies’, 8-9. See also Hendry, 
Understanding Japanese Society, 102-123.
(59)  Said, Orientalism, 94.
(60) Roger Goodman, ‘Introduction’, in Ideology and Practice in Modern Japan, Roger 
Goodman & Kirsten Refsing eds. (London: Routledge, 1992), 5.
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Imperial line. This view of Japan being drastically different from other nations 
in East Asia — culturally, historically, and even biologically — is still strongly 
supported by some Japanese, who believe that the ancestors of the Japanese 
came to the archipelago in the remote past, instead of the scientifically more 
probable theory that they came from the Korean peninsula around 400 BCE 
with knowledge of agriculture and displaced the indigenous hunter-gatherers.(61)
Perhaps from fear of the unearthing of archaeological evidence supporting the 
latter view, the excavation of some of Japan’s most important archaeological 
sites, Kofun —large, hill-like tombs constructed between 300 and 686 CE— 
is forbidden by the Imperial Household Agency. They are thought to contain 
the remains of the ancestors of the imperial family, and thus it is said to be 
“desecration” to investigate them.(62)
7  A Critique of Nihonjinron: Japan as a Homogeneous Nation
　One of the strongest criticisms of Nihonjinron is against the claim that Japan 
is a homogeneous nation while there actually exists significant ethnic, social, 
occupational, health, and age diversity. Nihonjinron and other generalised 
views on Japan ignore the groups of people who do not have the same sense 
of “Japaneseness.” The idea that Japan is uniquely homogeneous provides an 
excuse for the government’s policy of restricting immigration and services 
for foreigners. The argument runs as follows: since Japanese culture is so 
idiosyncratic, a multicultural community is not something Japanese people 
are ready for: Japanese people are not yet equipped to live with foreigners in 
a single society.(63) Emphasis on homogeneity constructs a “majority culture,” 
which downplays “minority culture,” and those who do not conform to the 
norm may experience prejudice, while their very “existence” is downplayed 
under the idea of homogeneous Japan.(64) In the past, groups of people such as 
(61) Jared Diamond, ‘Who are the Japanese?’ in Guns, Germs, and Steel (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2005), 426-47.
(62) Ibid., 428.
(63) Aoki, Nihon Bunkaron no Henyo, 154-5.
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Burakumin became targets of stigmatisation, and were discriminated against. 
Other groups such as the Ainu (the indigenous inhabitants of Japan), foreigners 
living in Japan, or other people with hybrid identities could become targets of 
discrimination even today.
　Sonia Ryang, in her article about Koreans in Japan, warns that a study of 
a minority group could further marginalize it by thoughtless labelling and 
carelessness about what the study brings to it.(65) This is because, in a society 
such as Japan where homogeneity is loudly proclaimed, being labelled as an 
outsider and not being categorised as inside the main group can itself provoke 
further social stigma. Hendry comments that “if people who are discriminated 
against take political action, and gain benefits, they draw attention to 
themselves and may spark further discrimination.” (66) In other words, the 
society is controlled in such a way that asserting one’s rights and pointing out 
injustice are discouraged by means of sanction.
8  A Critique of Nihonjinron: East and West Dichotomy
　Another strong criticism of Nihonjinron is its comparison of Japan with the 
idea of the monolithic and homogeneous “West.” Comparisons between Japan 
and the United States are very popular in the literature due to the history of 
the two countries. It is usually argued in Nihonjinron that Japan operates in a 
way exactly opposite to the West. By doing so, Nihonjinron claims that some 
Japanese ideas are untranslatable to foreigners, and only Japanese people 
can understand Japanese culture, which can easily promote cultural bigotry. 
Also, this line of argument ignores other countries in East Asia, with which, 
culturally speaking, Japan has much in common: instead, the only dialogue 
partner is the “West,” which implicitly suggests Japan’s prejudice against its 
Asian neighbours.(67) This idea of taking Japan out of Asia, so-called Asianism, is 
(64) Goodman, ‘Making Major Culture’, 69.
(65) Sonia Ryang, ‘Japan’s Ethnic Minority: Koreans’ in A Companion to the Anthropology of 
Japan,  Jennifer Robertson ed. (Blackwell Publishing Inc., 2005), 96.
(66) Hendry, Understanding Japanese Society, 107.
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a colonial mentality from before the Second World War, when Japan decided to 
become like one of the “West” by colonising its neighbours.(68)
　This hypothetical “West” can be compared to the one in Samuel Huntington’s 
book The Clash of Civilizations.(69) Drawing an East-West dichotomy, using the 
term “culture,” Huntington argued that the Islamic and Confucian cultures 
would become a threat to Western values, an idea that undoubtedly influenced 
the United States’ foreign policy after the September 11th terrorist attacks.(70)
9  Deconstructing Nihonjinron
　As mentioned above, Nihonjinron is at best mistaken, and is in fact devious. 
However, the reason why it became so popular in Japan is rather obvious. Ever 
since its encounter with the Western civilisation, Japan has been pursuing its 
unique identity, which sets it apart from the West while westernising itself. The 
idea of a homogeneous Japan has been politically helpful in uniting the country. 
The homogeneity myth is still strongly supported among Japanese people while 
the formalism of customs and language keeps the society controlled.
　As noted previously, Befu proposes that Nihonjinron is a national symbol 
in post-war Japan. The flag and anthem were not officially national symbols 
until 1999 when a special law was passed to declare them “national.” Befu 
(67) Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity, 75. Befu believes that there is a racial hierarchy the 
Japanese perceive: he says that they felt lower than Westerners, and felt superior toward 
the peoples of Southeast Asia and Africa, whose technological level is below Japan’s and 
who are not white. The fact that most Nihonjinron authors ignore Asian and African 
countries may support his proposition. However it should be noted that this type of 
unofficial hierarchy is observable in any society, though the order of hierarchy may 
differ.
(68) Goodman, ‘Making Major Culture’, 69.
(69) Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(Simon & Schuster, 1996).
(70) Lynne Y. Nakano, ‘Writing for Common Ground: Rethinking Audience and Purpose in 
Japan Anthropology’ in Dismantling the East-West Dichotomy, Joy Hendry & Heung Wah 
Won eds. (London: Routledge, 2006), 189-95.
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goes on to say that Nihonjinron took the place of State Shinto, which was the 
Japanese civil religion. He says, “If Nihonjinron is Japan’s civil religion, it is 
reasonable to regard it also as a manifestation of Japan’s cultural nationalism. 
After all, nationalism is religion.” (71) He then compares the Nihonjinron-as-civil-
religion and “Protestant civic piety,” the American civil religion. “Just as there 
was legitimising of Protestant values in America and integration of Protestant 
citizens as American, one can find in Japan legitimising of Shinto values and 
integration of Japanese subjects through Shinto.” (72) The stronghold of the civil 
religion is no longer Shinto, but Nihonjinron.
　Nihonjinron as a “scripture” of Japanese civil religion is an interesting 
hypothesis, yet Befu is reading too much of the American situation into the 
Japanese context. Even if there is Japanese cultural nationalism, it dif fers 
greatly from the American civil religion and the nationalism it promotes. 
Nihonjinron and its popularity is perhaps a result of the people’s search for their 
own cultural and national identity, but for most people, Japanese nationalism 
does not possess the fervour of American nationalism.  I would argue instead 
that Nihonjinron is a product of the reaction of Japan to its international 
political situation and to the impact of globalisation. When “westernisation” was 
the only way to survive as a nation, the people naturally sought to construct 
their own identity. In this process of construction, Christianity, especially the 
Protestantism that came in the 19th century, was of no help to the Japanese 
people. Unlike the Latin American countries, which were colonised in the 
16th century and became quickly Catholic, the Christian religion did not offer 
reasons for the Japanese people to convert: it remained the religion of the 
ultimate Other, the West. When the Japanese finally constructed their identity, 
their religion, and their society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries and finally became “like the West” in their imitation of Western 
colonialism, the country gave itself to totalitarianism, which eventually brought 
destruction in the Second World War to Japan itself, and with much damage 
(71) Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity, 112.
(72) Ibid.
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to surrounding Asian countries. One of the major Christian cities, Nagasaki, 
was destroyed by the atomic bomb, and the emperor was demythologised. 
Even then, Christianity had no place in the Japanese society, unlike the 
African nations, which became independent in 1960s, and where Christianity 
proliferated since. While the political system, social structure, capitalism, even 
pop-culture, and many other western neo-colonial discourses were employed 
to make “modern Japan”, through this process of westernisation, Christianity 
was never used as a tool for appropriation.(73) It was rejected because its place 
had been already filled: it was filled by the emperor system and myth, which 
survived after 1945 by transforming itself into the discourse of Nihonjinron. The 
claim of Christianity to be a representation of the “universal value” to promote 
modernisation was, on the whole, flatly rejected in the history of Japan. Japan 
did not need Christianity to become what it is today.
　Today in Japan, very few people are outspoken nationalists, and patriotism 
is much more subdued than that of the United States or even of European 
countries. However, Nihonjinron as a national symbol has strong influence 
in the society. The data is rather old, but according to Befu, a survey in 1987 
showed that 82 percent of Japanese people said that they were interested in 
the search for the Japanese identity while 13 percent indicated lack of interest 
and 5 percent did not answer.(74) Another survey in 1998 on the tenets of 
Nihonjinron showed that 38 percent of the sample agreed that the Japanese are 
a homogeneous people, 23 percent disagreed, and 39 percent were undecided. 
Also, 49 percent agreed that Japan was a unique culture while 42 percent did 
not answer. Less than 50 percent agreed about the importance of “Japanese 
blood” in defining Japanese culture.(75) Even though the proportion of people 
who support the major tenets of Nihonjinron is less than 50 percent, the idea 
of the Japanese being homogeneous is strongly supported by politicians, and 
(73) Ashcroft, Griffins & Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, 15.
(74) Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity, 76.
(75) Harumi Befu & Kazufumi Manabe, ‘An Empirical Investigation of Nihonjinron 
Propositions and the Function These Propositions Serve’ in Kwansei Gakuin University 
Annual Studies XXXVIII (1998): 35-62.
The Chrysanthemum No Longer Blooms: The End of Nihonjinron and Theology of Japan
54
is often used to legitimise a social or international policy. Nihonjinron is not a 
straightforward expression of nationalism, but it is the foundation on which the 
radical nationalists stand. The idea of the unique and homogeneous Japan is 
presupposed by the supporters of the emperor system and the political right, as 
well as by those who are not interested in politics.
　Gayatri Spivak, who argued against the discourse of essentialism, later 
supported the strategic use of an essentialist view of a society to fight against 
colonial and neo-colonial oppression.(76) However, in the case of Japan, this 
essentialist discourse, which at least par tly rejected European colonial 
discourse, was the basis for Japan’s own political and territorial colonialism 
of neighbouring Asia before 1945. The essentialist discourse later expressed 
in Nihonjinron was a by-product of the western colonial discourse, and yet 
was used as a mainstay of Japan’s own colonialism. Here, the danger and 
uselessness of the strategic essentialism is obvious.
10  Theology and Nihonjinron
　Taking account of the argument above, Christianity in Japan could be one of 
two types: that is, Christianity for nationalism and Christianity against it. For 
the former, there was an attempt by some Japanese theologians to develop 
a “Japanese Christianity” in the 1930s to 1940s. This was, however, a minor 
movement even then, and evaporated at the end of the Asia-Pacific War. Today, 
this type of Christianity is present among the new religions (newly emerged 
syncretistic religious institutions), or “new” new religions (post-1970s new 
religion), in which some elements of Christianity are placed alongside Japanese 
myths or animism.(77) The latter type — Christianity against nationalism — is 
prevalent among the “traditional” denominations of Christianity. Within this 
group, there are also two sub-types: those who side with the minority groups 
(76) Gayatri Spivak, ‘Criticism, Feminism and the Institution’ ; interview with Elizabeth Gross 
in Thesis Eleven 10/11 (1984-5 November/March): 175-187.
(77) For this, see Mark R. Mullins, Christianity Made in Japan: A Study of Indigenous 
Movements (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998).
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in the society, and those who critique the government’s policies as Christians 
and citizens of the country, often in the form of political activism. Examples 
of the former include a Japanese feminist theologian, Kinukawa Hisako, and 
a theologian from the Burakumin, Kuribayashi Teruo. In their theological 
endeavour, the Bible is read from their place, the margins of Japanese society, 
and they present readings that are distinctly different from the conclusions 
of the mainline churches, as both of them employ the critical view against the 
Bible itself and the church tradition.(78)  In his book Asian Biblical Hermeneutics 
and Postcolonialism (1999), R.S. Sugirtharajah evaluates these two biblical 
scholars in their use of the historical-critical method. 
For instance, recent exegetical examples of minority discourse worked 
out by Ahn Byung Mu, Kuribayashi Teruo, Hisako Kinukawa and 
James Massey may appear to be original Korean, Indian, or Japanese 
products, yet in a subtle manner they are based on and rework 
historical-critical principles. It is worth noting that most of these 
authors are transplanted or uprooted professionals who return to 
their caste, community, or tribe or re-present themselves as articulate 
members of various subaltern groups after learning their craft and 
Western theories of oppression at cosmopolitan centres. Since they are 
denied entry into the local mainstream interpretative arena, they adopt 
a negative attitude to their local traditions and share an antagonistic 
relationship to the dominant culture; hence they are attracted to these 
foreign theories.(79) 
　Sugirtharajah overlooked, however, the fact that in the context of Japan, 
(78) See for example, Hisako Kinukawa, Women and Jesus in Mark: A Japanese Feminist 
Perspective (Mar yknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994); Teruo Kuribayashi, Keikan no 
Shingaku: Hisabetsu buraku kaiho to Kirisutokyo [Theology of the Crown of Thorns: 
Liberation of Discriminated-against-Buraku and Christianity] (Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppan, 
1991); Teruo Kuribayashi, ‘Recovering Jesus for Outcasts in Japan: From a Theology of 
the Crown of Thorns’ in Japan Christian Review 58 (1992): 19-32. See also Japan Catholic 
Buraku Mondai Committee, ed. Seisho to Sabetsu [The Bible and Descrimination] 
(Tokyo: San Pauro, 1998).
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what Kuribayashi and Kinukawa are fighting against is the colonial discourse, 
though his point about their use of historical-critical method is accurate. Thus 
their “antagonistic relationship to the dominant culture” is not necessarily 
and simply evidence of their eager acceptance of the “foreign theories.” In 
fact, Kuribayashi published a book entitled, Nihon Minwa no Shingaku (The 
Theology of Japanese Folktales) in 1997, which is an attempt to understand 
the Bible and Christianity using Japanese historical and cultural resources; not 
being simply “nativist”, but rather working through the resources available 
both from Japanese and non-Japanese traditions.(80)  Drawing on Japanese folk-
tales, such as Momotaro (Peach Prince) or Issunboshi (The Little One Inch), 
Kuribayashi unfolds Christian narratives without generalising “Japan” or 
“Japanese” while maintaining his stance of “theology from below”. 
　Kitamori Kazo and Furuya & Ohki belong to the latter type of Christianity: 
that is, Christianity against nationalism.  Yet, in the case of Kitamori, in 
The Japanese and the Bible, the problem of essentialism is evident.  One 
commendable aspect, however, is Kitamori’s attempt to unfold what he meant 
by introducing the ‘Japanese’ concept of Tsurasa.  In the Theology of the Pain of 
God, Kitamori argues that the pain of God is the result of the fact that God’s love 
has overcome God’s wrath. Thus, the cross of Jesus Christ as a historical event 
becomes crucial. The God of the Trinity is not only the God who begets the 
Son, but also the God who let the Son die, in which God pains. In this, Kitamori 
insists that his idea is not Patripassianism, which would assert that God 
suffered on the cross as Christ. “Pain,” according to Kitamori, is not a “nature” 
of God, but a concept of relationship between the love and wrath of God. The 
synthesis of love and wrath is God’s pain, and it does not mean God suffers 
with the suffering; human suffering is an analogy, a symbol of the pain of God 
who went outside of Godself upon deciding to love sinners. To further explain 
(79) R. S. Sugir tharajah, Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and Postcolonialism (Shef field 
Academic Press, 1999),  129.
(80) Teruo Kuribayashi, Nihon Minwa no Shingaku [The Theology of Japanese Folktale] 
(Tokyo: Nihon Kirisuto Kyodan Shuppan, 1997).
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this pain of God, Kitamori argues that God’s pain is expressed with astonishing 
accuracy in the concept of the Japanese word Tsurasa, which means “tragedy” 
or “agony.” The word is often found in Japanese classical plays.  At this point, 
Kitamori sealed his assertion by a proclamation that if a Japanese person 
does not understand the concept, “the person is not Japanese-like.” (81)Yet in 
The Japanese and the Bible, he returned to this concept of Tsurasa by actually 
referring to the stories of Japanese classical plays, in much the same way as 
Kuribayashi’s methodology, to explain Christian doctrine.  Especially, when he 
uses the actual text of a play, The Love Suicides at Sonezaki (Sonezaki Shinjyu) 
from the early 18th century, it opens the possibility of comparative readings of 
the Bible and the play, though the essentialist tendency is still present.(82)  
　Furuya & Ohki’s Theology of Japan is a valuable work, much awaited after 
the long history of acceptance of Euro-centric theology in Japanese Christian 
academia. It is a careful study of Japan as an object of theologizing, yet is not 
entirely free from the over-generalization of Japan and the Japanese.  Furuya 
surveys the history of Christianity in Japan, focusing on its relationship with the 
Japanese government, and Ohki pursues the methodology of the Theology of 
Japan, yet both of them presuppose that there is an essence shared, throughout 
history, by Japanese people.  For example, Furuya refers to Nihonjinron itself 
and reinforces its argument, saying that those features were cultivated during 
the years of National Isolation from 1600s to 1850s.(83)  Ohki also sees “a typical 
Japanese mentality in Wakon Yosai [Japanese soul and Western technology]”.(84)
　If the Christianity that argues against nationalism is in fact one of the 
imported goods of neo-colonialism, it is as if you “chase away the bandits in 
your country with the help of a foreign army,” as Tagawa Kenzo put it in the 
(81) Kitamori, Kami no Itami no Shingaku (Tokyo: Kodansha Gakujyutu Bunko, 1966), 230.
(82) Kitamori, Nihonjin to Seisho, 62-112.
(83) Furuya and Ohki, Nihon no Shingaku, 50.
(84) Furuya and Ohki, Nihon no Shingaku, 237-245, quoted in Atsuyoshi Fujiwara, “The 
Theology of Ohki Hideo and theology of Japan” in A Theology of Japan: Origins and 
Task in the Age of Globalizaiton, Hideo Ohki et al (Seigakuin University Press, 2005), 36. 
Emphasis added.
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essay he wrote during his stay in Africa.(85) The colonial nature of Western 
methodology in Christian study has been pointed out: it is colonial “because 
they would have us believe that they have universal validity and significance 
although they emerged as a contextual response to the specific needs of 
Western academics.” (86) In the relationship with the cosmopolitan centre, how 
theological discussion of non-Western Christianity finds the contact zone, and 
transforms itself through hybridity, is a common issue among the scholars 
whose contexts are outside of the centre.
11  Conclusion
　In this article, I have argued against the discourse of Nihonjinron, and 
cautioned against its use in theology.  The Nihonjinron literature, which 
purports to be an anthropological study of Japaneseness, is actually a modern 
manifestation of nationalism and a by-product of  westernisation and a reaction 
to globalisation in the face of neo-colonialism.  I have surveyed the development 
and some criticisms of Nihonjinron and its relationship to Christianity in Japan. 
To realise this point would give theology in Japan a helpful perspective to 
understand the emperor system and where the Japanese Church stands.  At 
the moment, it stands between the Western-centred neo-colonial discourse, 
in which Christianity has often been a useful tool, and nationalism, which is 
discernible in a discourse such as Nihonjinron.  It has been about 150 years 
since Protestant missionaries arrived in Japan.   Today, even though Japan’s 
international situation is different from that of the mid-nineteenth century, 
these issues, which Christianity in Japan faces, is essentially the same: that is, 
(neo-)colonialism and nationalism. Christian scholars are expected to conform 
to the norm of the Western academics, and scholarly success is determined 
by how a scholar adapts to the Western academic norm, system, and interests. 
(85) Kenzo Tagawa, Rekishiteki Ruihi no Shiso [Thoughts from the Historical Analogy] 
(Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1976), 50.
(86) Sugirtharajah, Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and Postcolonialism, 128.
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Theological education follows the curriculum created in Europe or the United 
States, according to which, for example, the study of the New Testament 
includes the quest for the historical Jesus, Old Testament study begins with the 
documentary hypothesis, and all the courses are dominated by foreign names. 
I am not arguing that learning about these things is problematic by itself; 
instead, I am arguing that if one takes the approach set by the West, those who 
do not belong to the power of influence could never be equal to those in the 
centre, and would necessarily remain “colonised”. Another issue is nationalism. 
Japanese nationalism is thriving, taking different forms at different points in 
history. Behind this discourse, there is power, which demands conformity. If 
one takes the examples from Christian history in Japan, Uchimura Kanzo was 
aware of the Western power over Christianity, while Yanaihara Tadao fought 
against the issue of Japan’s expansionism. In fact, they are two different sources 
of power, and must be considered in relation to each other.
